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Philosophy Between the Minds 
Douglas Burnham 
 
 
Nietzsche loved brief, teasing allegorical narratives. So, I have attempted one. 
 
The Fourth Day: On the first day, the fool noticed simply that things change. Within the 
domain of the human, this is called ‘history’ in the broadest possible sense. Individuals are 
born, mature, have children, and die. Political, religious and economic systems develop and 
fall. Beliefs and values emerge and then are gone. Everything is History, said the fool. 
 
On the second day, the fool observed that not everything changes. Those things that are 
eternal do not change, and those beings who create the changeable do not change. Indeed, 
change itself may be an illusion masking the eternal. Moreover, he saw that even in nature, 
some things either do not change at all, or change very slowly: an Empire may fall, but the 
stars and mountains and forests are still there. So, insofar as human beings are related in 
some way to the gods or the stars, then there will be constants within and across the domain 
of the human. For example, human beings have minds or souls, by means of which we can 
participate in the divine order of things. And, in so far as human beings are a part of nature,  
there may be aspects within the domain of the human that do not change. We can call this 
‘human nature’. Reasoning and experiencing, these don’t change; pride, anger or love, 
these don’t change. 
 
By noon, the fool was reasoning thus: a number of distinctions arise, between those things 
that are in principle transient (within human history, we mean individual lives, political 
orders, beliefs and so forth), and those that do not change (the gods, the natural order as 
such including the basic character of the human). Likewise, there is a distinction between 
those aspects of human lives and even self-understanding that are governed by change (we 
will call this ‘culture’, the domain of activity) and those that do not, or at need not 
(philosophy, the domain of contemplation). Culture comprises those beliefs and values that 
come and go, although at any given time they may seem solid and given, and thus form 
‘what everybody knows’ or ‘common sense’. Philosophy is the striving for something 
permanent in the understanding of the human, of nature, and the ultimate meanings of both. 
Since philosophical truths are on principle remote from the sphere of culture and action, 
those human beings who live philosophical lives might sometimes make discoveries that 
they cannot reveal to culture. They thus write, if at all, esoterically. They see the history of 
philosophy as populated by their contemporaries, who speak to them in code across the 
centuries. Philosophy constructs bridges over abysses, high in the mountains, where most 
never tread. This, the fool thought, is the Philosophy of History.  
 
By afternoon, the fool’s thoughts changed. He observed the toil of the others in fields and 
battlefields, and wondered at the inefficacy of philosophical reason. Why should 
philosophy not be more like the blacksmith, producing new sturdy and sharp tools? 
Contemplation could transform activity; though culture may not be ready for this or that 
development yet, it soon will be. Esotericism remains necessary, as a temporary measure, to 
facilitate the philosophical transformation of culture. 
 
In the evening, however, as the air cooled and the people gathered together around the fires, 
this esotericism all seemed so unnecessary. We are equal, and we are all ‘in this together’, 
the fool said, and felt able to say it aloud. Let us write clearly and for everyone; if the 
domain of activity is to be reformed, let us do so together. The sublime thought of the 
esoteric faded from his mind. 
 
On the third day, the fool paused, thinking: those stars occasionally fall across the sky, the 
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mountains contain marine fossils, what was once forest is now moorland, and even the gods 
seem suspiciously absent these days – maybe they were never more than a fable? Just 
briefly, the fool thought he was back to ‘things change’. Swiftly, however, the fool realised 
that there was an important difference from that first day. The relationships between what 
formerly seemed changeable, and what did not, now appear quite complex. The eternal or 
natural aspects are not only subject to modification like everything else (albeit perhaps at a 
slower pace) but are also subject to modification by everything else. Within the human 
domain, this means: in accordance with their nature, human beings form culture, but also 
culture forms human nature. Everything is a double becoming, including philosophy and its 
truth. History, if it is anything at all other than a mere record of successive events, is the 
agonisingly slow liberation of the domain of action, certainly, but also the domain of 
contemplation. What is to be made free are the social and cultural conditions within which 
any thought or action are possible. We are historicists, we may even be relativists and 
postmoderns and other such names. This is the History of the Philosophy of History, so said 
the fool, and it is not at an end. 
 
On the fourth day. . . . But was there, will there be, a fourth day? 
 
We all know what esoteric writing in philosophy means; and we can all agree, I think, that there are 
at least instances of esoteric writing in philosophical history. Before I had even heard of Leo 
Strauss, it was clear to me that Plato in the Parmenides was playing a sophisticated game of cat and 
mouse with his readers, whoever they may have been. Likewise it was hard to miss that in Hume’s 
dialogues on religion, all the participants both are and are not at some point identifiable as 
Humeans. In each case, between the surface meaning and some underlying intent, available perhaps 
to insiders, there is so obvious a tension that even the surface meaning begins to crumble. No, what 
is at stake in Philosophy Between the Lines is not the existence of esoteric writing, but its 
prevalence, systematicity, and subsequent forgetting – along with a broadly political interpretation 
of these. Professor Melzer certainly shows the prevalence part, with an impressive barrage of 
examples and citations. Of course, if we are being strictly empiricist about this, all this evidence 
strung together (including the online appendix) is little more than a punctuation mark within the 
vast volume of western thought. But such doubts are beside the point: the evidence provided 
indicates a clear trend. Again, although I’m sure one could quibble about the details of this or that 
analysis, that is not the point, unless those quibbles become so numerous as to obscure the trend. 
Esotericism is – or is at least believed to be by other, later commentators1 – widespread within 
philosophy.  
 
However, prevalence or trend is still not systematic. That is to say, it does not yet prove that esoteric 
writing is the normal mode for philosophy, across centuries, and thus that a kind of extended 
conversation is taking place, between the lines, so far beneath the notice of most readers that it is 
not even looked for. Now, I do not believe that Melzer has demonstrated this -- although I also do 
not feel confident to judge the matter here in a few thousand words. Nevertheless, only such a 
systematic esotericism would lead to the important conclusions about the nature of reason and 
history that Melzer (following Strauss) wants to maintain. If we, looking back over centuries of 
philosophy, only see the exoteric – the messages of which are crafted not to upset the apple cart – 
we will (Melzer argues) have settled on the principle that reason is incapable of rising above the 
crass prejudices of its culture. The human mind is, for the most part, bound and gagged by its 
historical situation. Moreover, we will have lost sight of two distinct ways in which the life of 
contemplation might relate to the practical life of culture and history: an antagonistic relation, 
                                                 
1 This is a worry, to be sure. By its nature, the evidence has to be what commentators thought that some philosopher 
was up to. There is always the possibility, then, that esotericism is ‘discovered’ in texts, decades or centuries after 
they are written, the better to make them support ‘our’ cause.  
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typical of ancient thinkers, and a compatible relation, typical of more recent centuries, in which 
reason becomes practical and reforms the world. If, though, it is systematically the case that, under 
this surface meaning quite radical views can be found, then we have reason to reassess our analysis 
of the relationship between reason and history, in favour of a certain freedom of human rationality. 
Thereby also we might rediscover the ancient understanding of the contemplative life as distinct 
from the practical. The above account of the central argument may be very brief and leave out a 
great number of important details, but it is not, I hope, a caricature.  
 
So, if I do not think I can say anything about the systematicity thesis, what can I say? The enemy 
here is historicism. Although Melzer sees his argument as moving from systematicity to the fallacy 
of historicism, he does not try to hide the fact that – in part at least – the motivation is the other way 
around. A kind of intuitive repugnance at historicism drives the quest to discover esotericism. But 
what is historicism? Historicism, first of all, is a position defined primarily by its opponents 
(Popper, Strauss, etc.) -- an accusation and not a badge -- and therefore demonstrates more 
underlying variety than might be expected. There are certainly very few philosophers who say ‘I 
call myself a Historicist’. Nevertheless, let us sketch out provisionally a position that we can use for 
the sake of argument. Broadly, historicism is the thesis that all cultural products can only properly 
be understood within their historical context – indeed, are themselves indirect products of that 
context -- and that this context is constantly shifting. Shakespeare may seem to be our 
‘contemporary’, but such a Shakespeare is more our sock puppet than a genuine ‘universal genius’. 
As with esotericism, there is no doubt that this thesis is at least partially true. The specifically 
political and religious dimension of Macbeth (largely related to the ascension of James I) – without 
which the ‘Scottish Play’ would probably never have been written – is largely lost on a modern 
audience, although the play is nonetheless widely performed and appreciated. Although those 
dimensions can be reconstructed by a scholar, that reconstruction is likely to mean that he or she 
appreciates the play less in performance. For our purposes, the history of historicism begins in the 
18th Century, as a proto-romantic response to zealous neo-classicism. I am thinking, for example, of 
Herder, for whom Shakespeare is the authentic artist precisely because he does not cravenly try to 
imitate ancient tragedy like the French, but instead writes a drama that emerges organically from 
English soil.2 A few decades later and historicism and its sister, hermeneutics, are riding high partly 
because of Hegel.3 Historicism later takes on a pointed political dimension, most famously in Marx: 
ideas are a product of social and economic conditions; there is little point in intellectuals pretending 
that they can think outside their environment; thought, like the people who think, can only be 
liberated if the social and economic conditions are transformed.4 This notion eventually acquired 
the name ‘historical materialism’. This was and remains the high point of historicist thought, and 
for practical purposes the only innovation 150 years later is that postmodernists5 have become 
sceptical of the possibility of any such transformation. Now, as I will show below, this sketch of 
historicism is in fact a caricature, but it will have to serve for the moment. 
 
Nietzsche occupies a curious position in the debates about esotericism. On the one hand he is, of 
course, among the poster boys of historicism. Above all, there are the analyses found most famously 
in The Genealogy of Morality concerning the ‘breeding’ of human affects and modes of thought.6 
                                                 
2 Herder. Shakespeare. Trans. Moore. Princeton, 2008. The original was published in 1773. The connection of 
historicism with nationalism also begins in such analyses. 
3 It is worth noting that ‘hermeneutics’, although certainly dealing with historical phenomena as a problem, is not 
intrinsically historicist. Thus, in Truth and Method Gadamer feels he has to overcome much of 19th Century 
hermeneutics. 
4 This is the substance of the opening pages of The German Ideology. Prometheus, 1976. 
5 Whoever they are. 
6 Treatise two, section 2; Treatise 3, section 21 – to list only the most obvious. See also Beyond Good and Evil, 
section 199, and Twilight of the Idols, ‘Improvers of Humanity’. 
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The implication is, as it is expressed above in my aphorism, that there is a double becoming, a 
reverse influence of culture back upon human nature. There is little or nothing that is ‘ahistorical’, 
the human having been made, unwittingly for the most part and often disastrously, by the human. 
Nietzsche is thus famously dismissive of anachronism in morality.7 Here too belong his many 
critiques of the metaphysical neutrality of reason8, logic9, scientific method10 and even the notion of 
truth itself.11 All of these analyses suggest that those presumably a- or super- historical phenomena 
or methods are anything but. Rather than tools neutral to historical forces, Nietzsche tends to 
analyse them as tools of such forces. More specifically, Nietzsche as a scholar of ancient language 
and literature was convinced that the emotional life of the Greeks was essentially different, rather 
than just being the same affective system under different conditions.12  
 
On the other hand, Nietzsche is also among the saints of the idea of exceptionalism, the thesis that 
certain human beings are able to rise above their conditions and in some sense speak and indeed act 
beyond them, primarily but not exclusively about moral or political matters. This is the explicit 
reason Nietzsche wrote ‘Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,’ and the idea is found 
prominently again in the second Untimely Meditation, section 2.13 Nietzsche fondly attributes the 
idea of the ‘republic of genius’ to Schopenhauer.14 A similar notion is found in Nietzsche’s later 
writings, for example, in the discussion of Jesus in The Antichrist,15 or in the metaphor of 
Zarathustra’s abandonment of his home for a cave in the mountains.16 In both of those cases, the 
analysis is of a mind so untimely as to be incomprehensible to its hide-bound contemporaries, and 
finding its proper audience elsewhere (in disciples, although Jesus was poorly served by his) and 
elsewhen. 
 
We owe these ideas at least partially to the 19th Century’s romantic fondness for the hero as 
autonomous but also misunderstood and alone (just think of Byron’s Manfred or Carlyle’s On 
Heroes, the popular image of Beethoven, passages in Emerson’s Representative Men, Wagner’s 
heroes, and the long shadow that Napoleon cast over the century).  Do note, though, how curious it 
is that romanticism should be in part responsible both for the thesis of exceptionalism and of 
historicism. In fact, the idea of exceptionalism is needed precisely because of historicism. Without 
the latter, there would be nothing to be an exception to. For Enlightenment thought, with its 
vehemently anti-historicist models of reason and language, and with (as Melzer sees it) its 
compatibilist account of the relation of theory and practice, exceptionalism is unnecessary. The 
enemy is human nature, not culture, and that enemy will be vanquished by concepts like temperance 
and the formation of good habits, not by a quasi-religious transformation into an exception. 
Individuals (or classes) might vary as to their capacity for reason and for example in their ability to 
control their passions, but this variance is natural to the human.17 By contrast, Romantic 
                                                 
7 The thesis of the discontinuity of moral concepts is found already in The Birth of Tragedy and in the third Untimely 
Meditation. It then also appears, much later, in the first treatise of Genealogy. There he is thinking specifically of 
altruism, and has his old friend Rée and probably Spencer in his sights. 
8 E.g. Twilight of the Idols, ‘Reason in Philosophy’. 
9 E.g. Beyond Good and Evil, section 3. 
10 E.g. The Gay Science, section 344, or Genealogy, Treatise 3, sections 23-4. 
11 E.g. Beyond, section 34, or Twilight, ‘How the true world at least became a fable’. 
12 See the two ‘Eris’s in ‘Homer’s Contest’, or foolishness versus sin at Genealogy, Treatise 2, section 23. See also the 
alienness of the Greeks professed at Twilight, ‘What I owe the ancients’, section 2. 
13 Indeed, this idea is precisely the reason why those four short books are called ‘untimely’. 
14 See both the second and third Untimely Meditation. 
15 ‘This faith also does not formulate itself – it lives, it fights against formulas’ (section 32).  
16 In addition, Nietzsche talks frequently about the ‘exception’ in just this way, e.g. Daybreak, section 442, Gay 
Science, sections 3 and 76, or Ecce Homo, ‘Why I am a Destiny’, section 5.  
17 I feel uncomfortable talking in such generalities about the ‘Enlightenment’, ‘Romanticism’ or the ‘Ancient World’. I 
think these claims are warranted only insofar as we are talking about broad trends, and we do not forget the many 
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exceptionalism – and something similar is true in Nietzsche – involves what is to all intents and 
purposes a different species. 
 
On the other hand, in Strauss and Melzer’s characterisation of the ancient world as holding a 
broadly antagonistic view regarding the relationship of the active and contemplative lives, 
historicism is again assumed, albeit only for the vita activa. The philosopher, through a 
transformation of his or her way of living, and wresting free of the doxa of the city, becomes an 
exception. The esoteric-writing thesis thus assumes historicism, but somehow claims that it doesn’t 
apply to us. What is this ‘somehow’? To my mind, one key thing that Melzer’s theoretical chapter 
(ch. 3) lacks is a sustained account of how exceptionalism – the vita contemplativa – is possible. 
Without a solution to this, exceptionalism in any of its guises looks like wishful thinking. Can 
Nietzsche help us to make some progress here? 
 
The temptation is to discount both sides of Nietzsche’s analysis as residues of romanticism; this 
would be a mistake, not least because Nietzsche himself spear-heads the late-19th Century rejection 
of romantic excess. Nietzsche’s mindfulness for historical nuance and difference means that his 
‘exceptions’ – and certainly also the ‘future’ exception that is the Übermensch – need analysis as 
something other than Byronic heroism. Likewise, that there are such exceptions entails that his 
historicism is not as one-sided as that which Melzer decries. In terms of my cod-Nietzsche 
aphorism, that is, we can identify Nietzsche himself with none of the stages through which the fool 
passes. Instead, I suggest, Nietzsche represents the fourth day. 
 
Let us return to the above account of historicism. In my experience, the interpretations of ancient 
philosophy by those writers labelled historicist or postmodern are, in fact, much more radical and 
interesting than those given by other interpretative traditions. I’m thinking of Heidegger18, 
Gadamer19, Derrida20, Ricoeur21, Foucault22 or Badiou23, in particular. Now, why should this be the 
case? Well, the above description of historicism was a confessed caricature because it makes (at 
least) two assumptions, which are also shared by the fool on all three days. But these assumptions, 
perhaps more than any others, have been philosophically challenged over the past two centuries. 
Once we remove these two unfortunate assumptions, historicism – including Nietzsche’s – is 
revealed as not so one-sided, and as having resources that will be useful on the fourth day. This is 
why these philosophers are capable not only of accepting the existence of, but also of unearthing, 
‘ideas’ that diverge from the standard ways of reading. 
 
First, the above description of historicism assumes as fundamental the distinction between 
individual and group. According to this distinction, either we claim that the group does not exist, 
except as the assemblage of autonomous individuals24, or the distinction collapses and the 
individual is simply a function of the group. This assumption, although characteristic of a great 
                                                                                                                                                                  
who do not fit the mould. 
18 On the very first page of Being and Time, it is clear that the only philosopher Heidegger considers truly 
contemporary is ... Plato. Volumes of lectures are devoted to readings of pre-Socratics and especially Aristotle. Properly 
understood, the ‘destruction’ of the history of ontology is not an entirely negative operation; it rather uncovers the 
thought implicit but occluded in that history. 
19 Gadamer. Dialogue and Dialectic. Yale, 1983. 
20 e.g. ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ in Dissemination. Athlone, 1993. 
21 I’m thinking of the uses of Aristotle in the work on metaphor (The Rule of Metaphor. 3rd ed. Routlege, 2003) and the 
work on narrative (Time and Narrative. 3 vols. Chicago, 1984).  
22 As in the studies of Epicureanism and Stoicism in his early eighties lectures, collected as The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject, Picador, 2005.  
23 Again, Plato in Being and Event. Bloomsbury/Continuum, 2007. 
24 The locus classicus of this idea is Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation. Dover, 2007. vol. 1 p. 3. It should 
be noted that the term ‘individual’ hides an enormous range of definitions and measurements.  
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many philosophical traditions, is not one that can be laid at the feet of a sophisticated historicism. 
What is missing is any sense of a dynamic relationship – which is odd, since precisely a dynamism 
of this type is one of Hegel’s greatest and most famous ideas.25 A theory of dynamic relationship 
would claim, among other things, that individualism is not an all-or-nothing affair, and that a whole 
set of processes contribute to the emergence of a recognisable individual and indeed of the type 
social group within which such an individual could be recognised.26  
 
Second, the caricature takes, again as fundamental, the equation of thinking or belief with 
consciousness27, and thus with what I may say or write, or choose not to say or write.28 Again, this 
assumption is very common, but not among those we are calling historicists. Rather than relying 
upon the distinction between expressed and unexpressed, many so-called historicists or 
postmodernists can also talk about the ‘unconscious’ very broadly speaking.29 By this is meant 
thought that is not simply present to or having its origin in transparent consciousness, and indeed 
that does not in the first instance ‘belong’ to an individual mind, but which is in some other way 
found and operative in their individual or collective behaviours, especially the use of language.30  
 
Now, consider for example the Strauss and Melzer account of vita contemplativa as a different way 
of living in the ancient world. As we noted above, this in turn requires a story concerning one’s 
wresting free of the illusions of the tribe, e.g. the ascent from the cave. In other words, it assumes a 
historicism -- we are not ‘pure minds’, as Melzer notes -- but then pursues only a fully apolitical, 
individual solution to that historicism. But because postmodernism does not take individualism for 
granted, it can offer a much more intriguing, and politically useful, account of this ‘wresting free’. 
In particular, it can talk about the role of institutions, or other types of political and social 
organisation, in the development of the philosophical mind. A good example would be a school, the 
Academy or Lyceum, a form of pedagogy not limited to an individual’s encounter with an esoteric 
text.31 Indeed, with Nietzsche, we can talk about cultural life self-transcending itself in the 
exception.32 Likewise, when Strauss and Melzer defend reason, it tends to be pictured as a reason 
that is a conscious instrument in the hands of an individual who then, in a sovereign act of will, 
chooses whether to speak. Here, we find no sense of writing and indeed living as practices, as a 
working-out-of thought and of life, or otherwise as part of the ‘wresting oneself free’.33 Ancient 
Greek and Roman philosophers were one and all concerned with the details of life practices – 
eating, sleeping, hygiene, routine – and with character and virtue considered not as states but as 
practices.34 These did not emerge from a philosophical system as its results or supplements; these 
practices comprise the philosophical life. Likewise, without such an account, we can only conceive 
                                                 
25 The ‘master and slave’ dialectic in The Phenomenology of Mind being only the most obvious. Here, also, Arendt’s 
The Human Condition (Chicago, 1958) merits mention. 
26 These processes are the important thing, and many philosophers thus see the emergence of an individual per se as an 
effect and not in itself an end. 
27 The locus classicus is of course Descartes for whom the existence of the self, thinking, and consciousness were all 
equivalent. 
28 In 20th Century criticism, this is sometimes called the ‘Intentional Fallacy’ – the assumption that what is found in the 
work must at some point have been a conscious intention in the author. 
29 A dangerous word. One of the thinkers relevant here is Freud, but he by no means the only one.   
30 With the exception of some phenomenological traditions, ‘consciousness’ is among the least used words in 
continental philosophy. Although we tend to anachronistically read ancient thought as a philosophy about 
consciousness, this is probably an error. 
31 Other examples of institutions whose relationship to the maturation of philosophical reasoning are not confined to 
the preliminaries, nor are simply barriers, might include marriage, the church, friendship, the library, etc. 
32 Nietzsche’s theme of decadence or corruption often carries this meaning; see e.g., Gay Science, section 23. 
33 I believe Melzer is aware of these – they are gestured toward in Philosophy Between the Lines – but they are not 
made central and they’re certainly not developed.  
34 We should add to this list ‘skepticism’, a theme that Melzer following Strauss develops in chapter 10. 
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a ‘school of thought’ as the sum of the ideas expressed by its representatives, rather than seeing it as 
a movement that bears and makes thought possible. Similarly, it would make no sense to talk about 
‘Greek philosophy’ or ‘German philosophy’ otherwise than as a handful of themes upon which a 
number of figures agree – the concept of a philosophical tradition as itself something serving as a 
medium of thought is lost.35  
 
Historicism or postmodernism, absolved of our original caricature, is still not a badge. However, I 
also think it is no longer an obvious straw man, to be easily knocked over and then ignored. 
Historicism includes intellectual resources for analysing, not the manner in which historical 
circumstances bound and gag thought, but how they function within a dynamic relationship with the 
emergence of thought. Although I am not even convinced that the antagonistic relation of 
contemplation and practice is the correct way to understand ancient thought, to even ask that 
question requires that we understand much more about how contemplation emerges against the 
backdrop of the latter. To my mind, the resources of historicism can only help us here. The fourth 
day is a return to neither the second (the theory of the necessity of esotericism, including its 
forgetting), nor the third (historicism in its caricature version, which at best leads to some hope for 
future, revolutionary redemption). Instead, I suggest that we look for the fourth day in a rather more 
modest place: a patient understanding and construction of the conditions (including material 
conditions) for, and the practices of, thought.  
 
 
                                                 
35 Indeed, rejecting the caricature, we can in a Heideggerian vein talk about the way in which a language is not simply 
a tool for the representation of ideas, but itself thinks. 
